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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to draw a distinction between two 
interrelated yet fundamentally different ways of approaching problems in 
computer ethics, with the goal of clarifying which problems call for which 
approaches. In a nutshell, I will draw a distinction between approaches and topics 
that are primarily concerned with how technologies affect the world, on the one 
hand, and those primarily concerned with how technologies affect our mind, on 
the other. I will argue that the type of approach we choose should be determined 
on the basis of which of these concerns we are primarily trying to address, which 
will also shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of the multitude of 
approaches to be found in ethics of technology. In order to clarify and justify this 
distinction, I will categorize some common approaches in computer ethics 
correspondingly, and I will conclude by offering a set of suggestions for how they 
can and should complement each other in a way that yields an exhaustive analysis 
of the problem at hand.  
The purpose of this paper is to draw a distinction between two interrelated yet 
fundamentally different ways of approaching problems in computer ethics, with the goal 
of clarifying which problems call for which approaches. In a nutshell, I will draw a 
distinction between approaches and topics that are primarily concerned with how 
technologies affect the world, on the one hand, and those primarily concerned with how 
technologies affect our mind, on the other.13 It should be emphasized at the outset that 
these categories are not absolute or mutually exclusive – and it is certainly not my 
intention to argue that one is better than the other. My more modest intention is to argue 
that the type of approach we choose should be determined on the basis of which of these 
concerns we are primarily trying to address, which will also shed light on the advantages 
and disadvantages of the multitude of approaches to be found in ethics of technology.  
                                                 
13
 This distinction is reminiscent of Floridi & Sanders’ emphasis on the distinction between agent-oriented 
and patient-oriented ethics (2002), but this distinction is somewhat misleading in this context, because 
both technology and the mind can have a role as both agent and patient, being both source and target of 
good and evil. 
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There is little doubt that technologies affect both the world and the mind, and there is 
little doubt that there is no sharp distinction between the two. What affects the world can 
affect the mind, and what affects minds can affect the world – and technology often 
mediates between world and mind. As such, the distinction I am concerned with must 
necessarily be more of the ‘family resemblance’-type. Still, we can to some degree 
separate between different ways of assessing these effects, and given the multitude of 
ethical theories and applied frameworks that are being used in ethics of technology, it is 
important to be clear about which approach is best suited for which area.  
The clearest example of this is probably the distinction between accountability and 
responsibility. If the purpose of our analysis is to understand what is accountable for a 
given situation, we can do this entirely in terms of analyzing changes to the world. After 
all, an inquiry into accountability is largely an inquiry into causality; what was the source 
of this good or evil (cf. Floridi & Sanders, 2004, p. 371). This also highlights the 
advantage of using a “mind-less” notion of accountability in cases where (higher-order) 
mental processes are either non-existent (e.g. artificial agents) or intrinsically distributed 
(e.g. organizations). If the purpose of our analysis is to understand responsibility, 
however, we are immediately required to include the mind in a much more integral 
manner. After all, an inquiry into responsibility is an inquiry into such mental terms as 
intentions, negligence, and culpability. To give another example, when evaluating how 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) affect privacy, we can focus on 
how ICTs affect the world in a manner that is relevant to privacy, or how it affects our 
mind in a way that is relevant to privacy. The former involves such question as “How do 
ICTs affect the flow of information”, or what Floridi refers to as ‘ontological friction’ 
(2005). The latter involves questions such as “How do ICTs affect our expectations 
about privacy?” and “How can loss of privacy affect our well-being?”. If we look to 
environmental ethics, we can make a similar distinction between the effects a 
technological innovation may have on the environment, on the one hand, and their effect 
on e.g. opinions about sustainability, on the other. We can make a similar distinction 
when evaluating cultural consequences, by either looking at how technologies may 
change the material conditions necessary for certain cultural practices, or how they more 
directly change people’s cultural values and attitudes. 
Clearly, the questions are interrelated and both sets of questions should be sought 
answered in a comprehensive analysis, but the approaches and methods we utilize in 
doing so will typically be centered on one of the two sets. To clarify this further, we can 
attempt to categorize different approaches according to their main concerns.  
On the one hand, some theories and approaches are particularly good at evaluating 
how technologies affect the world. Again, one clear example is Floridi’s notion of ‘re-
ontologization’  (2005) and the use of an informational level of abstraction, which is an 
interesting and often insightful way of conceptualizing how the world changes as a result 
of our increased ability to digitize information . Other examples of this type of approach 
is Actor-Network theory (Latour, 2005), as well as recent post-phenomenological work 
on technological mediation (Verbeek, 2005). The strength of these theories is that they 
shed light on how technologies affect the world and our ways of interacting with the 
world. They do not, however, say much about how technologies affect the mind. Surely, 
the changes to the world that they disclose will very often lead to changes in mind, but 
this is not their main concern.  
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On the other hand, some theories and approaches are particularly good at evaluating how 
technologies affect the mind. Among the approaches in this category, we can include 
approaches that are grounded in some version of virtue ethics or utilitarianism, as well as 
axiological approaches. The main concern of these approaches is not to understand how 
technologies affect the world, but rather how they affect our moral character, behavioral 
dispositions, expectations, quality of life, and so forth. Certainly, technologies often 
affect our mind through changing the world – indeed, they always do so if we regard the 
technology itself as a change to the world. Nevertheless, the main concern of these 
approaches is not to get a better understanding of how states of affairs in the world 
change, but rather to get a better understanding of how mental processes change. This is 
the ultimate goal of the analysis. If we take video game violence as an example, a virtue 
ethical analysis of this phenomenon would not be particularly interested in how these 
games may affect the physical world, but rather how they will affect the mind of those 
who interact with them. Will they make them more aggressive, less altruistic, more 
happy? 
One reason for distinguishing between these approaches is that they give rise to 
different types of normativity, and to show how these can be related to each other. 
Approaches that are primarily interested in changes to the world can be described as 
cautionary. That is, the effects that technologies have on the world will in many cases 
imply a caution; technology x will lead to change y, and this change might be ethically 
problematic. In order to take that last step, however, we need approaches that include the 
mind in order to argue that change y is ethically problematic because it affects the mind 
in a particular way. This can be seen clearly when teaching computer ethics to 
pragmatically oriented computer scientists, where showing that technologies change the 
world will often lead to the perfectly rational question: “That might very well be true, but 
why is that a problem?”. Answering that question must somehow include the mind. 
In the full paper, I will further clarify the nature of this distinction, knowing very 
well that it is problematic and rests on a number of philosophically controversial 
presuppositions. I will also justify why the mind is essential for most topics in computer 
ethics, and discuss what this means for how we ought to approach these topics. Some of 
the main conclusions will be that computer ethics is necessarily and intrinsically a 
pluralist area of investigation, one that needs to address both the world and the mind. 
More substantially, it will be argued that we need to get a much better understanding of 
how different approaches can complement each other and how analyses of changes to the 
world can be integrated into analyses of changes to the mind. I will conclude the paper 
by offering a few suggestions on how to do so, using privacy as one of the main 
examples. 
References: 
Floridi, L. (2005). The ontological interpretation of informational privacy. Ethics and Information 
Technology, 7(4), 185-200. 
Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2002). Mapping the foundationalist debate in computer ethics. 
Ethics and Information Technology 4, 1-9. 
Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2004). On the Morality of Artificial Agents. Minds and Machines, 
14(3), 349-379. 
The Computational Turn: Past, Presents, Futures? 
 - 189 - 
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Verbeek, P.-P. (2005). What things do: philosophical reflections on technology, agency, and 
design. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
